

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ADP-00 MBFR-02 NSC-10 NSCE-00 INR-09

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 NEA-06 L-02 PRS-01

SAJ-01 IO-03 OMB-01 TRSE-00 ACDA-10 GAC-01 EB-03

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION GENEVA

USLOSACLANT LOSA

USDOCOSOUTH. RUFTTRRA/ USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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LIMDIS

E. O. LL652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, PFOR, NATO, XG

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON CSCE AND MBFR

1. AT HIS REQUEST, SOVIET EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY BYKOV, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW, MET WITH DEPTOFF APRIL 2 FOR DISCUSSION OF CSCE AND MBFR.

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2. CSCE: BYKOV SAID THAT MOSCOW IS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THE CONSULTATIONS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND

US DELS AT HELSINKI. HOWEVER, HE STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PROLIFERATION OF COMMITTEES AND THE SLOW PACE OF THE MPT, AND BELIEVE THAT THE US COULD AND SHOULD APPLY SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER PRESSURE TO ITS ALLIES TO MOVE AHEAD. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME ANY INDICATIONS OF EFFORTS THE SOVIETS MIGHT UNDERTAKE, UNILATERALLY OR IN COORDINATION WITH THE US, DURING THE FORTHCOMING MPT RECESS TO PROD THE WESTERN EUROPEANS TO MOVE MORE QUICKLY. IN RESPONSE, DEPTOFF INDICATED THAT, WHILE WE HAVE SUPPORTED A FASTER TEMPO AT HELSINKI, THE VIEWS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING OTHER NATO ALLIES, HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, AND THAT, IN RETROSPECT, A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SINCE NOVEMBER 1972. BYKOV QUESTIONED WHETHER, EVEN WITH AN ACCELERATED PACE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE MPT IN TIME FOR A MINISTERIAL GATHERING IN LATE JUNE. HE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO HOLDING TO THE TIMETABLE " AGREED WITH THE US." MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS OPPOSE ANY FURTHER RECESSES IN MPT. DEPTOFF REPLIED THAT THE US CONTINUES TO ANTICIPATE A MINISTERIAL GATHERING IN LATE JUNE, AND IS PREPARED TO SEE MPT COMPLETE ITS WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER ROUND IV BEGINS. DEPTOFF ALSO INDICATED THAT THE FORTHCOMING RECESS WOULD PROVIDE A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY, BOTH FOR THE NATO ALLIES AND THE SOVIETS, TO REASSESS THEIR POSITIONS ON ISSUES IN VARIOUS BASKETS, SEARCHING FOR POSSIBLE COMPROMISES TO BE TABLED LATER IN MPT.

2. CSCE: PRINCIPLES. BYKOV IDENTIFIED FRONTIER INVIOLABILITY AS THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE IN BASKET 1, INDICATING THAT THE SOVIETS ATTACH VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CLEAR STATEMENT OF THIS " PRINCIPLE" SEPARATELY FROM ANY OTHER PRINCIPLE. REFERRING TO RECENT FRG- SOVIET DISCUSSIONS, HE ENVISAGED THAT A COMPROMISE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, BUT HE DID NOT SPECULATE ON THE FORM IT MIGHT TAKE.

3. CSCE: MILITARY SECURITY. IN CONNECTION WITH CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES (CBM' S), DEPTOFF INDICATED
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IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A FURTHER INDICATION OF THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO REFER TO MAJOR MOVEMENTS, AS WELL AS TO EXERCISES. BYKOV SAID THAT, WHILE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES IN MOSCOW WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT REFERENCE TO MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIET MILITARY WERE OPPOSED. DEPTOFF INDICATED, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THIS ISSUE COULD PERHAPS BE ADDRESSED BY THE COMMISSIONS IN THE SECOND PHASE OF CSCE, WHERE PARTICIPANTS COULD PROVIDE ILLUSTRATIVE TYPES OF MOVEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE

PRE- ANNOUNCED. BYKOV AGREED THAT ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION BY THE NATO ALLIES MIGHT HELP IN SOLVING THE DIFFICULTY, SINCE THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SCOPE OR TYPE OF MOVEMENT ENVISAGED FOR PRE- ANNOUNCEMENT.

4. WITH RESPECT TO LINKAGE BETWEEN MBFR AND CSCE, BYKOV NOTED THAT SOME NATO ALLIES APPEAR TO CONTINUE TO WISH TO ADDRESS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF MBFR IN CSCE. DEPTOFF POINTED OUT THAT SOME NEUTRALS, AND AT LEAST ONE EASTERN STATE, ALSO FAVORED SOME LINKAGE, BUT STATED THAT US CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TALKS. CONCERNING MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES OTHER THAN CBM'S, BYKOV SAID THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENVISAGE GENERAL REFERENCE TO MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, IN A BLAND FORMULATION, PERHAPS TO BE CONTAINED IN PRINCIPLES DECLARATION.

5. CSCE: COOPERATION. BYKOV SAID THAT BASKET 2 DISCUSSIONS APPEARED TO PRESENT NO SERIOUS PROBLEMS. DEPTOFF REVIEWED RECENT MPT DISCUSSION ON MFN AND NON- DISCRIMINATION ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT MANDATE PUT FORWARD BY THE EAST, AND INDICATED THAT THE NATO ALLIES CONTINUE CONCERNED ABOUT REFERENCE TO THESE. HE ALSO SAID THAT EAST HAD NOT YET CLARIFIED, TO HIS KNOWLEDGE, ITS OBJECTIVES IN PROPOSING A EUROPEAN PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION. IN THIS REGARD, BYKOV SAID THAT THIS PROGRAM WAS INTENDED TO ENCOURAGE AND FACILITATE SUCH COOPERATIVE PROJECTS AS THE PIPELINES NOW BEING CONSTRUCTED FROM EASTERN TO WESTERN EUROPE, AND FACTORIES NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION BY WESTERN EUROPEAN FIRMS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE EAST FURTHER TO
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SPELL OUT ITS AIMS, PERHAPS IN BILATERAL CONTACTS DURING THE MPT RECESS.

6. CSCE: HUMAN CONTACTS. BYKOV SAID THAT BASKET 3 PROMISED TO BE THE MOST DIFFICULT FOR THE EAST, AND SUGGESTED THAT COMPROMISES IN THIS AREA WOULD LIKELY BE ESSENTIAL.

7. CSCE: FOLLOW- ON. IN REPLY TO BYKOV'S QUESTION CONCERNING US ATTITUDE TOWARD BASKET 4, DEPTOFF DREW ON ALLIED STEERING BRIEF PROPOSAL TO SUGGEST ILLUSTRATIVELY AS AN INITIAL STEP THAT COMMISSIONS ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH BASKETS 2 AND 3 IN PHASE 2 USEFULLY COULD SEEK TO IDENTIFY ISSUES POSSIBLY REQUIRING FOLLOW- ON AFTER CSCE. BYKOV DID NOT CHALLENGE THIS APPROACH; RATHER, HE APPEARED TO AGREE WITH THE LOGIC OF PROCEEDING IN THIS

FASHION TO DEFINE POSSIBLE TASKS. HE OFFERED, HOWEVER, NO ELUCIDATION ON ROLE SOVIETS MAY HAVE IN MIND FOR FOLLOW- ON MACHINERY.

8. CSCE: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS. BYKOV SAID THAT THE EAST CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT A SUMMIT GATHERING SHOULD MARK THE FINAL PHASE OF CSCE, THOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET REACHED A DECISION ON PREFERRED VENUE. BYKOV SAID THAT THE PACT STATES CONTINUED TO FAVOR HELSINKI FOR THE SECOND PHASE, BUT THAT " CERTAIN FACTORS" WERE LEADING ALSO TO CONSIDERATION OF GENEVA.

9. MBFR: BYKOV ASKED IF THERE WERE SUBSTANTIVE REASONS FOR THE DESIRE OF SOME NATO ALLIES TO INCLUDE HUNGARY AS A DIRECT PARTICIPANT. DEPTOFF INDICATED THAT SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO HUNGARY' S STATUS, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

IN RESPONSE TO BYKOV' S QUERY, DEPTOFF SAID THAT THE ALLIES CONTINUE TO ENVISAGE NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER- OCTOBER, AND FURTHER WORK WAS UNDER WAY IN PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. BYKOV SUGGESTED THAT, WHEN ALLIED POSITIONS WERE DEVELOPED, AND PRIOR TO ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR
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THE US AND USSR TO EXCHANGE VIEWS INFORMALLY. PARTICULARLY USEFUL, HE SAID, WOULD BE INDICATIONS OF ALLIED OBJECTIVES, SINCE, HE SAID, SOVIETS STILL WERE NOT PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IN RESPONSE TO BYKOV' S QUERY WHETHER THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD BE RAISING ISSUES RELATED TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, DEPTOFF SAID THAT THE ALLIES, AS SOVIETS ARE AWARE, BELIEVE MBFR SHOULD FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE. IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSION ON US FORCES IN EUROPE, BYKOV ASKED IF THE US WERE MOTIVATED IN MBFR SOLELY BY THIS ISSUE. DEPTOFF REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT' S RECENT SPEECH AS AN INDICATION OF THE INTEREST THE US CONTINUES TO ATTACH TO MBFR, AND SAID THAT MBFR HAS BEEN VIEWED BY THE US AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE DETENTE PROCESS, WHICH SHOULD DEAL WITH CONCRETE ISSUES.

10. FOR ALL ADDRESSEES: FOREGOING IS FYI RPT FYI ONLY.

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